Mindlessness and the Law by Heald, Paul J. & Heald, James E.
Digital Commons @ Georgia Law 
Scholarly Works Faculty Scholarship 
9-1-1991 
Mindlessness and the Law 
Paul J. Heald 
University of Georgia School of Law, heald@uga.edu 
James E. Heald 
University of Florida 
 
Repository Citation 
Paul J. Heald and James E. Heald, Mindlessness and the Law (1991), 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_artchop/378 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ Georgia 
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ 
Georgia Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access For more information, please contact 
tstriepe@uga.edu. 
MINDLESSNESS AND LAW
Paul J. Heald* and James E. Heald**
Every day includes much more non-being than being.
-Virginia Woolf
AT times my first-year students become frustrated by the applica-
tion of economics to the law. Interestingly, the objection is not
political-they do not complain that utility is an illegitimate value or
one that common law judges may not implement. They are more con-
cerned with the reality of basic economic assumptions about human
nature. The economists' rational, wealth-maximizing decisionmaker,I
I am told, is far removed from their experience. People often lack
important information or fail to process correctly the information
they have. If law is about influencing decisions, I am asked, why
assume an unrealistic decisionmaking model? A review of legal schol-
arship reveals that my students' uneasiness is shared by many aca-
demics.2 The controversy has been the subject of several interesting
dialogues.'
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Georgia. J.D. 1988, University of Chicago.
** Professor Emeritus, University of Florida. Ph.D. 1956, Northwestern University.
The authors would like to thank Al Alsohuler, Kenneth Bowers, Richard Craswell, Robert
Ellickson, Ellen Langer, Robert Lucas, Fred McChesney, and the Honorable Richard Posner
for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this work. A special thanks goes to Michael
Wells for helpful suggestions made at all stages of progress and to the Emory University
School of Law's faculty colloquium.
I See, e.g., Posner, An Economic Analysis of Sex Discrimination Laws, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1311, 1315 (1989) ("[A]il people ... consistently act to maximize the excess of their private
benefits over their private costs.").
2 See, e.g., G.E. White, Tort Law in America 220-21, 230 (1980); Ellickson, Bringing
Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics,
65 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 23 (1989) [hereinafter Ellickson, Culture and Human Frailty]; Ellickson,
Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 Stan. L.
Rev. 623 (1986) [hereinafter Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle]; Kelman, Consumption Theory,
Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. Cal. L. Rev. 669 (1979); Latin,
Activity Levels, Due Care, and Selective Realism in Economic Analysis of Tort Law, 39
Rutgers L. Rev. 487 (1987) [hereinafter Latin, Activity Levels]; Latin, Problem-Solving
Behavior and Theories of Tort Liability, 73 Calif. L. Rev. 677 (1985) [hereinafter Latin,
Problem-Solving].
3 See Posner, The Future of Law and Economics: A Comment on Ellickson, 65 Chi.-Kent
L. Rev. 57 (1989) [hereinafter Posner, Future] (responding to Ellickson); Posner, Can Lawyers
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Critics of the behavioral assumptions underlying economic analysis
of law commonly complain that economists
fail to apply a comparable degree of realism to all relevant factors;
they fail to provide a sense of proportion about factors that are most
likely to be important or prone to miscalculation in specific accident
contexts; and they rely on broad behavioral generalizations to reach
overbroad conclusions, despite great variations in the actual risk-
assessment capacities and propensities of actors in diverse settings.4
G. Edward White adds that "there are numerous tort litigants with
no familiarity with negligence or its rules, no consciousness of acci-
dent prevention, and perhaps not any interest in 'utility maximiza-
tion.' It seems quixotic to think of such persons as rational planners
.... "5 White concludes, as have many others, that "the assumptions
made by economic theory about the motivations of humans are
gleaned from a world that does not resemble the world of tort
claims." 6 The failure of law and economics to offer a more plausible
decisiomaker is fatal, critics argue, because much of the contribution
of economic theory in the field of law suggests that legal rules be
crafted to influence human decisionmaking.7
The immediate answer to such criticism has been to admit that
"people frequently are inattentive, ignorant about the law and about
accident probabilities, hopelessly clumsy, and so forth, and that these
things blunt the effectiveness of tort law as a deterrent to careless
behavior."8 The point is quickly made, however, that the power of
Solve the Problems of the Tort System?, 73 Calif. L. Rev. 747 (1985) [hereinafter Posner,
Lawyers] (responding to Latin). For an excellent chronicle of the debate between sociologists
and economists over the value of economic theory, see Rational Choice: The Contrast Between
Economics and Psychology (R. Hogarth & M. Reder eds. 1987) [hereinafter Rational Choice].
4 Latin, Activity Levels, supra note 2, at 488.
5 G.E. White, supra note 2, at 220-21; cf. Gjerdingen, The Coase Theorem and the
Psychology of Common-Law Thought, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 711, 750-52 (1983) (presenting the
debate between Mark Kelman, on one side, and Elizabeth Hoffman and Mathew Spitzer, on
the other, over the validity of the Coase Theorem: "Coase assumes that people treat
opportunity income, which neoclassical economists feel people implicitly 'spend' whenever
they do not sell a saleable right or good, in the same way as actual received income, which they
explicitly spend. Consumers simply do not behave in this manner." (quoting Kelman, supra
note 2, at 698)).
6 G.E. White, supra note 2, at 230.
7 See, e.g., W. Landes & R. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law 30 (1987) (stating
that "the threat of punitive damages should deter a potential injurer").
8 Posner, Lawyers, supra note 3, at 751.
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any theory is its ability to correctly predict results,9 and at least some
empirical studies support the predictive power of the economic
model. ° Whatever the defects, we are told, in the economists' sim-
plistic presumption of a rational, wealth-maximizing decisionmaker,
they do not seem to detract seriously from the predictive value of the
theory. Furthermore, its very simplicity makes it easy to apply and,
therefore, more valuable."
We believe both sides are correct. Human beings are imperfect
decisionmakers-we often lack information, fail to assess accurately
the information we have, and behave irrationally. And yet, in the real
world of frequent information failure, high transaction costs, and
human computational frailty, the tort system was created on and per-
sists in the assumption that legal rules deter in an effective manner.
As noted above, this assumption has some empirical support.
In a 1985 essay, Judge Richard Posner suggested that his behavior-'
ist critics could "contribute to economics, by reconstructing... a
more realistic model of human behavior toward danger than one that
abstracts from information costs."' 2 In this Article, we offer a model
of human decisionmaking to explain how the realities of human
nature and the reality of efficient deterrence may coexist. Although
this Article introduces into legal scholarship certain decisionmaking
models developed by psychologists and social scientists, our primary
purpose is not to suggest that the economic model be transformed or
adjusted. We resort to alternative models to show that the human
potential for unconscious information gathering and assessment can
explain the mechanism by which people react to legal rules in the way
predicted by law and economics. Essentially, we hope to make econo-
mists' assumptions seem more "real."
9 Id. at 750-51; see also M. Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics 14 (1966) (asserting
that the test of the value of positive economic theory is not the reality of its assumptions but its
predictive accuracy).
10 Posner, Lawyers, supra note 3, at 749-50 & nn.12-14 (describing various studies). This
Article assumes the validity of empirical studies indicating that tort law influences conduct at
least some ofthe time. If the numbers consistently proved otherwise, even Judge Posner would
admit that the game is over.
II See Posner, Future, supra note 3, at 62.
12 Posner, Lawyers, supra note 3, at 753; see also Ellickson, The Case for Coase and Against
"Coaseanism," 99 Yale L.J. 611, 612 n.6 (1989) ("A richer law-and-economics would take
more explicit account of cognitive limitations, the psychological disposition to value a thing in
hand more than a prospect, and the influence of internalized norms.").
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No less an authority than Milton Friedman has argued that
improving the realism of assumptions in economic theory, although
hardly essential to establishing the absolute validity of the theory
(purely an empirical question), may offer several benefits. First, a
"restructuring" (to use Posner's term) of an assumption may help
explain divergences between predicted and observed results.13 Sec-
ond, an explanation of why a seemingly unrealistic assumption does
not destroy the predictive value of a theory may strengthen the theory
by connecting it to "a more general theory that applies to a wider
variety of phenomena.., and has failed to be contradicted under a
wider variety of circumstances." 14 Also, a different and more "realis-
tic" explanation of an assumption may facilitate an indirect test of the
hypothesis by its implications.15
We hope this Article will make economic theory more attractive in
all three of the above ways and will constitute an effective response to
critics of law and economics. Part I of this Article reviews several
behavior-based criticisms of economic analysis of law. In order to
answer the criticisms discussed in Part I, we have included an intro-
duction to psychological "script theory" in Part II. A brief descrip-
tion of the theory might have sufficed, but we hope that a fuller
exposition, including some reference to empirical data, may more
effectively provoke investigation and application to legal scholarship.
Thus, in Part II we examine relevant models of human decisionmak-
ing developed recently in the fields of psychology and social science,
and these models are based on evidence that unconscious information
gathering and assessment play an important role in human
decisionmaking.
13 M. Friedman, supra note 9, at 31 n.22.
14 Id. at 20. Friedman uses the example of an assumption that "each leaf deliberately
[seeks] to maximize the amount of sunlight it receives." Id. at 19. In spite of the fact that this
assumption is untrue, it may be used to construct a theory that will predict accurately the leaf
density on parts of trees. The explanation that "purely passive adaption to external
circumstances" is the true force behind leaf distribution does not give the theory a greater
empirically measurable predictive power, but it does link the theory to a greater body of
biological science and thus makes the theory "more attractive." Id. at 20.
15 Id. at 23; see also id. at 26-30 (discussing use of assumptions as an indirect means of
testing a theory). Indirect proof of an economic theory is especially appropriate when the
empirical evidence (due no doubt to the uncontrollable nature of the subject matter) is neither
overwhelming nor entirely consistent.
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Part III will use the models to suggest why economists' seemingly
unrealistic notions concerning human behavior need not blunt the
value of their insight into the efficient deterrence rationale of the tort
system. Section A of Part III accepts the validity of the handful of
empirical studies demonstrating that people react to legal rules in the
manner predicted by law and economics. We use the models
described in Part II to suggest the mechanism by which those rules
affect behavior. We conclude by defusing potential attacks that could
be made on our explanation by researchers who demonstrate the
existence of "cognitive illusions."16 In Section B, we relax the
assumptions underlying the economic model and consider Robert
Ellickson's claim that legal rules are frequently a less important deter-
minant of behavior than cultural norms. We conclude that even if the
assumptions underlying the economic model are faulty, law and eco-
nomics remains a powerful tool for explaining the common law.
I. CRITICISM OF BEHAVIORAL ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING LAW
AND ECONOMIC SCHOLARSHIP
Several attacks have been made recently upon the behavioral
assumptions of those who apply economic theory to the law. 17 First,
however, a brief overview of these assumptions will be helpful.
A. Economic Man
University of Chicago economist George Stigler has set forth suc-
cinctly the behavioral assumptions upon which economic theory is
16 See infra Part I.B.3. A cognitive illusion is demonstrated when subjects systematically
behave inefficiently in spite of perfect information.
17 This type of attack is hardly new. See M. Friedman, supra note 9. Friedman laments
that too much time has been focused on the realism behind economic assumptions. He devotes
most of the first 43 pages of his book to explaining the theory of theories. Id. at 7-43. The
realism of assumptions, asserts Friedman, is irrelevant if the theory accurately predicts
outcomes:
Truly important and significant hypotheses will be found to have "assumptions" that
are wildly inaccurate descriptive representations of reality, and, in general, the more
significant the theory, the more unrealistic the assumptions (in this sense). The reason
is simple. A hypothesis is important if it "explains" much by little, that is, if it abstracts
the common and crucial elements from the mass of complex and detailed circumstances
surrounding the phenomena to be explained and permits valid predictions on the basis
of them alone.
Id. at 14 (footnote omitted). This understanding of the function of theory is apparently as
necessary today as 35 years ago. See, e.g., W. Landes & R. Posner, supra note 7, at 9-14.
1991] 1131
Copyright 1991 Virginia Law Review, used by permission
Virginia Law Review
based: "[Pleople act efficiently in their own interests.... [They] learn
all the presently knowable things it pays them to know-always on
average-and act with due regard for this knowledge." 18 Human
beings rationally seek to maximize their own utility. The Coase Theo-
rem is a familiar example of this premise at work.19 In a world of
perfect information and zero transactions costs, actors in a market
will seek to maximize their wealth regardless of the assignment of
property rights. The premise is uncomplicated and easy to apply.
Economic analysis of law accepted this behavioral premise as the
foundation of its assertion that the common law has sought to facili-
tate the optimization of human resources by creating a system of
incentives and disincentives for utility-maximizing people. For exam-
ple, because a rational actor will cease wrongful conduct only when it
no longer maximizes the actor's utility, the common law prescribes
punitive damages in situations where compensatory damages substan-
tially fail to effect internalization of the costs of wrongful conduct.
Similarly, an economist would expect to see a rise in accidents when a
no-fault insurance scheme diminishes the personal liability of drivers
who cause accidents. The premise is essential to the proposition that
"'law and economics' analyses share one central behavioral assump-
tion-that imposition of liability substantially affects how categories
of actors respond to the risks they create or confront."'2
B. Criticism of Economic Man
1. Casual Empiricism
The simplest type of attack on the behavioral assumptions underly-
ing law and economics comes from critics like Howard Latin. Latin
charges that law and economics is grounded in propositions that find
no support in human experience or in simple common sense. His cri-
tique of the premise that liability rules influence decisions on accident
prevention assumes that:
a series of behavioral hypotheses.., must all be correct before impo-
sition of tort liability will achieve the predicted results: typical actors
must know the liability rules associated with various forms of con-
18 Stigler, Economists and Public Policy, Regulation, May-June 1982, at 13, 16. Stigler's
statement also appears in Latin, Problem-Solving, supra note 2, at 685.
19 See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1960).
20 Latin, Problem-Solving, supra note 2, at 677 (footnote omitted).
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duct; they must possess sufficient information and evaluative skills to
assess potential risks; they must pay attention to risks and corre-
sponding liability rules when they engage in risky activities; and the
category of actors assigned liability must evaluate the costs and bene-
fits of alternative choices in a meaningful manner. In short, liability
rules will promote social engineering objectives only to the extent that
prospective injurers and victims can, and typically do, undertake
informed problem-solving behavior with respect to the risks for which
they may be liable.21
Disregarding empirical evidence concerning the predictive power of
the economic model as a whole, Latin argues that the theory's under-
lying hypotheses are incorrect.
Latin makes the general observation that human beings have a lim-
ited capacity for knowledge and risk assessment. People misperceive
risks, distort and improperly assess information, and often labor
under "cognitive strain."' 22 Moreover, "Imany forms of behavior are
'programmed' or habitual," and "people employ highly simplified
decisional criteria. ' 23 Thus, Latin concludes that "informed problem-
solving behavior is a relatively infrequent phenomenon compared
with the multitude of choices people must make."'24 He asserts this
casual empiricism as a refutation of economic analysis as currently
applied to law.25
At this juncture, we should note that one aspect of information-
based criticism of law and economics already has been addressed. 6
In the marketplace, imperfect information does not always produce
noncompetitive prices and terms.27 As long as a sufficient number of
consumers possess adequate information, the market will respond as if
all consumers had adequate information. 28 A relatively small number
of comparison shoppers can produce a competitive market. In such
21 Id. at 678 (footnote omitted).
22 Id. at 683-84.
23 Id. at 684.
24 Id.
2 See also G.E. White, supra note 2, at 220-21, 230 (refuting economic analysis); Kelman,
supra note 2, at 678-83 (same).
26 See Beales, Craswell & Salop, The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J.
Law & Econ. 491 (1981); Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect
Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 630 (1979).
27 See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 26, at 631.
28 Id. at 638, 649-51 (finding that a relatively small number of comparison shoppers can
render a market efficient).
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cases, it is inefficient to expend energy to inform all consumers
because additional information would not increase wealth. Obvi-
ously, when such market conditions exist, the claim that consumers
lack perfect information does not threaten the economic model.
Although economics generally assumes a rational decisionmaker, it
does not always assume perfect information.
This Article, however, defends law and economics from the charge
of imperfect information in a different way. Script theory, set forth in
Part II, suggests that people unconsciously possess much more infor-
mation than they appear to have. Other commentators have sug-
gested that inadequate information is not always a problem; we
suggest that information inadequacy itself is less common than
supposed.
2. Empirical Studies: Social Norms and Legal Knowledge
Several critics of law and economics have gathered empirical evi-
dence suggesting the falsity of the theory's behavioral assumptions.
Robert Ellickson's research is particularly illuminating.29 In investi-
gating dispute resolution in a rural California county, Ellickson found
that legal rules had little effect on actual decisions:
When adjoining landowners ... decided how to split the costs of
boundary fences, they reached their solutions in almost total igno-
rance of their substantive legal ights.... [in addition] virtually all
rural residents applied a norm that an animal owner is responsible for
the behavior of his livestock, even in situations where they knew that
a cattleman would not be legally liable for trespass damages....
[Miost rural residents badly misperceived the applicable substantive
law. 30
Ellickson's most important findings indicate that nonlegal (social)
norms often supplant substantive laws, and decisionmakers often lack
knowledge of the applicable legal rules.
Ellickson has collected other data that support his findings. As a
sample, he cites a study of insurance adjusters who frequently applied
comparative negligence principles in jurisdictions where contributory
29 See Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle, supra note 2; see also R. Ellickson, Order Without
Law (forthcoming 1991) (further analysis and critique of law and economics).
30 Ellickson, A Critique of Economic and Sociological Theories of Social Control, 16 J.
Legal Stud. 67, 84 (1987).
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negligence constituted a complete defense;"1 a study in Norway show-
ing the negligible impact of housemaid labor regulations on maid/
employer dispute resolution;32 and laboratory evidence that in con-
trived game situations players frequently do not engage in Pareto
optimal exchanges when given the opportunity to do so. 33  This
research suggests two possible problems with law and economics.
First, if the observed norms are inefficient, they provide evidence that
people are not rational maximizers of wealth. Second, if conforming
to these norms creates more wealth than conforming to the applicable
legal rules, 34 then doubt is cast on the economic teaching that com-
mon law rules are efficient.35
Not only has the role of social norms gone unappreciated by legal
economists, argues Ellickson, but so has the degree to which deci-
sionmakers lack information regarding the legal rules governing their
behavior. This empirically demonstrable phenomenon suggests legal
rules lack the deterrent impact presumed by law and economics.
Ellickson's own work,36 and studies from Texas,37 Michigan,38 Nor-
way,39 and California4 show that people frequently do not know the
content of the legal rules that supposedly govern them. Such studies
arguably support the conclusion that common law tort rules do not
induce efficient behavior.
31 Id. at 85 (citing H.L. Ross, Settled out of Court 240-41, 275-76 (rev. ed. 1980)).
32 Id. (citing Aubert, Some Social Functions of Legislation, 10 Acta Sociologica 98 (1967)).
33 Id. at 86 (citing Hoffman & Spitzer, Entitlements, Rights, and Fairness: An Experimental
Examination of Subjects' Concepts of Distributive Justice, 14 J. Legal Stud. 259 (1985)).
34 See, e.g., Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the
Whaling Industry, 5 J. Law, Econ. & Organization 83 (1989) [hereinafter Ellickson, Whaling
Industry]; Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle, supra note 2, at 687 (hypothesizing that the "norms
that govern the relations among members of a group tend to maximize the aggregate wealth of
group members").
35 Ellickson, supra note 30, at 81 ("Most law-and-economic scholars and other legal
instrumentalists have underappreciated the role that nonlegal systems play in achieving social
order."). Ellickson's critique is hardly so broad as Latin's; in fact, a recent issue of the Yale
Law Journal finds him actively defending Ronald Coase from an unfair line of argument. See
Ellickson, supra note 12.
36 Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle, supra note 2, at 667-71.
37 Williams & Hall, Knowledge of the Law in Texas: Socioeconomic and Ethnic
Differences, 7 Law & Soc'y Rev. 99 (1972).
38 Note, Legal Knowledge of Michigan Citizens, 71 Mich. L. Rev. 1463 (1973).
39 Aubert, supra note 32, at 101.
40 Givelber, Bowers & Blitch, Tarasoff, Myth and Reality: An Empirical Study of Private
Law in Action, 1984 Wis. L. Rev. 443 (examining psychotherapists' knowledge of a landmark
legal decision governing their duties of disclosure).
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3. Empirical Studies: Computational Frailties and Cognitive
Illusions
A different body of data suggests that even given sufficient informa-
tion to allow for wealth-maximizing decisionmaking, human beings
still frequently fail to act efficiently. Ward Edwards and Detlof von
Winterfeldt have undertaken a partial categorization of the evidence
that information alone does not ensure efficient choice.41 They dis-
cuss several phenomena:
a. Conservatism. The failure of subjects to revise initial opinions
when presented with relevant new information.4 2
b. Ignoring Base Rates. The failure of subjects to employ effec-
tively prior probabilities ("base rates") in the face of specific individu-
ating data.4 a
c. Ignoring Sample Size. The failure of subjects to take into
account the size of the sample from which inferences are to be
drawn. 4
d. Nonregressive Prediction. The failure of subjects to "sufficiently
account for the lack of perfect correlation [when making] predictions
by matching the dependant to the independent variable. '45
e. Overconfidence. The failure of subjects to predict accurately
the possibility of error in their judgments."
41 See Edwards & von Winterfeldt, Cognitive Illusions and Their Implications for the Law,
59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 225 (1986).
42 Id. at 229-32 (citing Phillips & Edwards, Conservatism in a Simple Probability Inference
Task, 72 J. Experimental Psychology 346 (1966) (reporting that subjects systematically
underestimated probabilities that a bookbag contained predominantly a certain color of poker
chip)).
43 Id. at 232-35 (citing, among others, Kahneman & Tversky, On the Psychology of
Prediction, 80 Psychological Rev. 237 (1973) (reporting that subjects asked to predict whether
a personality profile described an engineer or a lawyer ignored information regarding the
proportion of lawyers to engineers in the pool of personality profiles)).
44 Id. at 235-37 (citing Tversky & Kalmeman, The Belief in the Law of Small Numbers, 76
Psychological Bull. 105 (1971) (reporting that people, even those with statistical training,
regard small samples to be highly representative of the population despite the fact that
probability theory counsels against such inferences)).
45 Id. at 237-38 (citing Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 43 (reporting that subjects
inaccurately predicted student grade point averages based on aptitude test scores even when
knowledge of correlation between the two was provided)).
46 Id. at 238-42 (citing, among others, Pitz, Subjective Probability Distributions for
Imperfectly Known Quantities, in Knowledge and Cognition 29 (L. Gregg ed. 1974)).
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f Hindsight. The failure of subjects to describe accurately what
could have been foreseen.47
The psychology of "cognitive illusions" may suggest that legal rules
do not deter efficiently because human beings are unable to process
relevant information and draw the inferences necessary to make the
desired (predicted) decision under a given rule. The real-world deci-
sionmaker characterized in the research summarized by Edwards and
von Winterfeldt is far removed from that described by Stigler at the
beginning of this Article.
In conclusion, empirically based and intuitive attacks on the behav-
ioral assumptions underlying much law and economic theory raise an
interesting question: how can the information-starved, cognitively
deluded decisionmaker presented in Part I act as a wealth-maximizer
and still respond to legal rules in the way predicted by law and eco-
nomics? 48 The seeds of an explanation lie in the models of decision-
making set forth in Part II below.
II. DECISIONMAKING AND NONTHINKING
Decisionmaking proceeds from both conscious and nonconscious49
states of awareness. At times, decisionmakers are fully aware of the
cognitive activity that leads to a decision. At other times, the con-
scious mind is unengaged or only marginally engaged, thereby leaving
to nonconscious processes the task of moving the decider through all
or parts of the decision task. In the latter case, the decider may be
unable to recall the sequence by which the decision was reached.
Consider the plight of the billiard player, either novice or expert, as
described by Milton Friedman. The billiard player would take his
shots
as if he knew the complicated mathematical formulas that would give
the optimum directions of travel, could estimate accurately by eye the
angles, etc., describing the location of the balls, could make lightning
calculations from the formulas, and then make the balls travel in the
47 Id. at 243-44 (citing Fischoff, Attribution Theory and Judgment Under Uncertainty, in 1
New Directions in Attribution Research 421 (J. Harvey, W. Ickes & R. Kidd eds. 1976)).
48 See W. Landes & R. Posner, supra note 7, at 312, 316 (admitting uncertainty as to how
legal rules affect behavior).
49 The term "nonconscious" is used herein to refer to states of "unawareness" or
"mindlessness" as opposed to the terms "unconscious" with its medical connotation and
"subconscious" with its psychiatric (Freudian) meaning.
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directions indicated by the formulas. Our confidence in this hypothe-
sis is not based on the belief that billiard players, even expert ones,
can or do [consciously] go through the process described; it derives
from the belief that, unless in some way or other they were capable of
reaching essentially the same result, they would not in fact be expert
billiard players.'"
Friedman also developed a business analogy, arguing that businesspe-
ople do not literally solve simultaneous equations any more than bil-
liard players actually make complicated mathematical calculations.51
Both somehow "figure it out" and then act as if they had employed a
sophisticated mental calculus to guide their behavior. An attribu-
tional psychologist 2 would have great difficulty in determining from
observations the conscious or nonconscious precursors to such
behavior.
A. Mindful (Rational) Man
In analyzing wealth-maximizing behavior, either concrete or psy-
chological, personal or corporate, monetary or nonmonetary, what
are the available models? The prescriptive theorists would have deci-
sionmakers identify their problems, establish their objectives, gather
and analyze available and relevant information, and consider alterna-
tive means of achieving their goals. Only then would a decisionmaker
50 M. Friedman, supra note 9, at 21.
51 Id. at 22.
52 For a seminal exposition of "attribution theory" see F. Heider, The Psychology of
Interpersonal Relations (1958). Psychologists aligning themselves with attribution theory
accept the formidable task of attributing to observed behavior those causes that appear most
reasonably justified. They study the attributions people make under given circumstances and
consider how those attributions devolved. Research in this area indicates:
the structure and meaning of the events experienced by an individual derive from
attributional analyses that are often subtle and complex. Phenomenologically, such
analyses may at times appear to be fully represented in the person's consciousness.
These occasions may typify only one end of a continuum, however; since on other
occasions the analyses seem to occur partially, if not entirely, out of conscious
awareness.
Introduction to Part I: Attribution at the Personal Level, in 2 New Directions in Attribution
Research 1 (J. Harvey, W. Ickes & R. Kidd eds. 1978) [hereinafter New Directions]. An
example of an attribution, that could have arisen either consciously or nonconsciously, is that
which a student might make after receiving a low score on a test. The student might attribute
the score to the test being "too hard" or "unfair." The student might even attribute the low
score to lack of study. An attributional psychologist hearing the various explanations might
attribute the "unfair" remark as arising from an external locus of control or the "lack of study"
remark as arising from an internal locus of control.
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choose from among those alternatives that held the highest promise of
maximizing the object of the decision.53  This process, being con-
sciously reasoned, is rational, and, accordingly, those who would fol-
low it are assumed to be rational decisionmakers. 54
Recent literature in cognitive psychology, cognitive social psychol-
ogy, and attribution psychology, as well as in information processing
and social judgment theory, indicates that the rational processes out-
lined by the prescriptionists do not represent actual decisionmaking
behavior. Nevertheless, to understand the different model presented
in Section B of Part II, a selective review of rational processing and
the role of cognition is necessary.
1. Cognition
George Mandler suggested that cognitive events occur under four
conditions. 55 First, we may invoke consciousness to process a new
thought or action. The novelty of an environmental situation stimu-
lates conscious, thoughtful processing.56 Second, when called upon to
judge or decide, we may consciously weigh possible outcomes and
potential actions. Third, we may invoke consciousness when habits
do not work or plans seem to be falling apart. Fourth, we may search
memory to accomplish recall. Each of these occasions may utilize
consciousness; nonconsious activity may be occurring prior to, dur-
ing, or after the conscious events.
Of considerable import to both conscious and nonconscious
processes is the nature of stored learning, for it is from our memory
that we retrieve, consciously or nonconsciously, the components of
conscious thought. What we perceive, what we feel, and what we
learn seem to be based upon associations between various elements in
53 See Mitchell, Rediker & Beach, Image Theory and Organizational Decisionmaking, in
The Thinking Organization: Dynamics of Organizational Social Cognition 293, 293-316 (H.
Sims, D. Gioia & Assoc., eds. 1986) [hereinafter The Thinking Organization].
54 See Feldman, On the Difficulty of Learning from Experience, in The Thinling
Organization, supra note 53, at 263. Feldman has noted that "people are said to violate the
'rationality' of expected utility theory because their stated preferences do not match the
calculated utilities of a set of alternatives." Id. at 265.
55 See Mandler, Thought Processes, Consciousness, and Stress, in Human Stress and
Cognition 179 (V. Hamilton & D. Warburton eds. 1979).
56 See, e.g., Langer & Newman, The Role of Mindlessness in a Typical Social Psychological
Experiment, 5 Personality & Soc. Psychology Bull. 295, 295-98 (1979).
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our environments and their perceived relationship to outcomes.5 7
Jack Feldman posited a role for experiences and maintained that "cul-
ture, training, and background influence attention to cues and their
categorical interpretation. '15
2. Categorization
That there can be categorical interpretations implies a capacity to
conceive and otherwise develop categories, to store experiences by
categories, and to retrieve categories from storage. Conception, stor-
age, and recall are facilitated by the distinguishing characteristics of
categorical members and the associations among the characteristics as
well as among the categories.
The processes of categorical development, storage, and retrieval are
somewhat analogous to computer storage and retrieval systems
wherein the lowest level of subdirectories contains the most discrete
categories (as in "letters," "speeches," "memos," and "manuscripts"
stored in word-processing files) whereas the root directory is reserved
for larger "chunks." A "path command" may be invoked to sort
quickly through the various subdirectories to access the specific file
(category) containing the data and associations sought.
Objects with characteristics perceived as similar but not identical
comprise a conceptual category or subcategory,59 and categories may
be "chunked" into more generic "prototypical" categories comprised
of several lower categories that contain shared attributes.' To illus-
trate, we learn that birds have feathers and that fish do not, but we
also come to know that there are several kinds of birds. This kind of
knowledge facilitates the formation of a prototype labeled "bird"
wherein feathers are a shared attribute among the raptors, songbirds,
and waterfowl. The prototype has all the properties common to the
group. 61 The raptors, as a subcategory of "birds," would share the
feathers attribute with the prototype but would have distinguishing
57 Feldman, supra note 54, at 266.
58 Id.
59 See Dutton & Jackson, Categorizing Strategic Issues: Links to Organizational Action, 12
Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 76, 76-90 (1987).
60 See Rosch, Principles of Categorization, in Cognition and Categorization 27, 27-48 (E.
Rosch & B. Lloyd eds. 1978).
61 See U. Neisser, Cognition and Reality: Principles and Implications of Cognitive
Psychology (1976).
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attributes of talons and more nearly binocular eyes around which a
raptor category could be conceived.
Objects are not the only things categorized. We store memories of
our actions and actions of others as well as images of many kinds, 62
for example, situations and events,6 3 language and labels,64 scripts and
schema.65
Insofar as we are able first to retrieve and then to apply informa-
tion, events, causes, effects, and associations related to a situation, we
are likely to be labeled as rational-particularly by persons who
stored similar elements for use in similar situations.
B. Mindless (Rational) Man
The above discourse on cognitive events and how they come to bear
on social behavior admittedly is simplified. But it does facilitate an
understanding of how a mindless state can be associated with rational
behavior in decision settings. The idea of a mindless act being
rational seems oxymoronic: How can an act be rational without being
reasoned? How can a person reason while functioning in a mindless
way? Perhaps such reasoning cannot be done, but it seems certain
that we can behave, borrowing Friedman's phrase, as if we had
reasoned.
As early as 1896, researchers documented nonconscious function-
ing. Leon Solomons and Gertrude Stein reported several experiments
to demonstrate the phenomenon.66 They were able to write words
and later to take dictation while simultaneously reading aloud. They
also found it possible to engage in oral reading while attending con-
sciously to a story being read to them. They stated:
"We have shown a general tendency, 'on the part of normal people, to
act, without any express desire or conscious volition, in a manner in
general accord with the previous habits of the person, and showing a
62 See Mitchell, Rediker & Beach, supra note 53.
63 Dutton & Jackson, supra note 59, at 76-90.
64 Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson & Boyes-Braem, Basic Objects in Natural Categories, 8
Cognitive Psychology 382, 382-439 (1976).
65 Abelson, Script Processing in Attitude Formation and Decisionmaking, in Cognition and
Social Behavior 33, 33-45 (J. Carroll & J. Payne eds. 1976).
66 Solomons & Stein, Normal Motor Automatism, 3 Psychological Rev. 492, 492-512
(1896), cited in Langer, Rethinking the Role of Thought in Social Interaction, in New
Directions, supra note 52, at 35, 35-68.
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full possession of the faculty of memory; and that these acts may go
on just as well outside the field of consciousness; that for them, not
only volition is unnecessary, but that consciousness as well is entirely
superfluous and plays a purely cognitive part, when present."'67
Solomons and Stein were able to function in a nonconscious fashion
as if their minds were fully engaged on the cognitive task at hand. In
fact, as Ellen Langer has suggested in her research, people may be far
less cognitively active than has been presumed.68
Additionally, the attributionists seem to have ascribed far too much
conscious mental activity to people engaged in ordinary tasks. 69 Den-
nis Gioia and Charles Manz have concluded that automatic process-
ing plays a significant role in guiding organizational behavior.70
Warren Thorngate also has presented a corollary view: "[T]he role of
thought in social interaction has been overstressed. In view of the
cost of thought and the redundancy of social interaction, it is argued
that habit is a much more common determinant of social behavior
than cognition. 71
Consider the behavior of the new driver of a stick-shift car. Each
action is tediously considered, sometimes even orally, as the driver
reviews the steps necessary for starting and shifting the car: "Let's see
now. Put the key in the ignition. Now... depress the accelerator
once to get some gasoline into the engine. So far so good! Now
67 Langer, supra note 66, at 37.
68 Langer, The Illusion of Competence, in Choice and Perceived Control 301, 301-13 (L.
Perlmuter & R. Monty eds. 1979).
69 See id.
70 Gioia & Manz, Linking Cognition and Behavior: A Script Processing Interpretation of
Vicarious Learning, 10 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 527, 527-39 (1985). Gioia and Manz were
interested in linking vicarious learning, that which comes from observing the (modeling)
behavior of others and its later consequences, with "scripted" behavior as described in the text
that follows. Drawing from the work of A. Bandura, Social Learning Theory (1977) and E.
Tulving, Episodic and Semantic Memory (1972), they concluded that observed episodes can
produce an "episodic script" that guides the observer when faced with similar situations in the
future.
71 Thorngate, Must We Always Think Before We Act?, 2 Personality and Soc. Psychology
Bull. 31, 31 (1976). Thorngate concluded that cognitive approaches to understanding human
behavior, with their focus on the role of thinking as a behavioral mediator, were inadequate to
explain behavior in social settings. Id. at 31-35. With reference to the earlier works of William
James; Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin; Slovic and Lichtenstein; Newell and Simon; and Russo
and Rosen, he concluded that "cognitive strain is a costly feature of thought," and "the
assumption that individuals attempt to keep the costs of thought below some threshold set by
their information processing capacities and time constraints constitutes one of the major
axioms of the heuristic approach to cognition." Id. at 31.
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depress the clutch, and... oops, I almost forgot to put my foot on the
brake. Okay, now turn the key. What do you know, it worked! Now
what? Oh, yeah, release the emergency brake and let the clutch out
slowly .... .
The scenario continues until the cadet driver proceeds cautiously
down the road in high gear. Only a few weeks later, the driver han-
dles this complex sequence of actions routinely and without conscious
thought as he simultaneously talks to a passenger and listens to the
car stereo. What began as a highly alerted, conscious act became an
automated sequence of behaviors. This behavioral "script" most
likely will continue until some novel stimulus jolts the driver into
resuming fully conscious control.
1. Scripts for Mindless Actors
If automatic behavioral sequences, or scripts, devolve from a non-
conscious state, and if we behave rationally with regard to these
unreasoned entities, we have identified the mindless (rational) man.
Robert Abelson theorized that throughout our lives particular pat-
terns of behavior are expected of us in recurring social situations.72
Given the redundancy of the settings, we are inclined to develop
scripted behaviors encompassing coherent sequences of events appro-
priate for given situations.73 Roger Schank and Robert Abelson have
posited that "the over-all organization of memory is a sequence of
episodes organized roughly along the time line of one's life." 74 They
concluded that "[a]s an economy measure in the storage of episodes,
72 Abelson, supra note 65, at 36. Abelson, generally accepted as the principal developer of
script theory, was concerned that cognitive psychology relied too heavily on a belief that
knowledge can be represented by "propositional networks, and that understanding involves
some form of matching input to known propositions." Id. He became convinced that
variations in individual's experiences cause them to develop different scripts for later
expression in similar circumstances. He did accept, however, that some common scripts,
derived from similar experiences within a common culture, become almost universal.
73 Id.
74 R. Schank & R. Abelson, Scripts, Plans, Goals, and Understanding 19 (1977). In their
"restaurant" example, Schank and Abelson suggest that our behavior in a restaurant may
follow a "restaurant script" developed over many similar experiences in dining out. Each new
visit may add unique features from a particular dining episode to the more generic script.
They would agree that the restaurant script invoked upon entering a fast-food franchise might
differ from the one invoked upon entering a fine French restaurant. The respective scripts
would have developed from the particular experience of eating in each restaurant. Id. at 42.
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when enough of them are alike they are remembered in terms of a
standardized generalized episode which we will call a script.1
75
Abelson conceived scripts as being composed initially of
"vignettes," consisting of an image stored with an identifying label.76
The vignettes could be stored separately or divided into categories
based on perceived similarities. Abelson's hierarchy of scripts begins
at the lowest level with the episodic script that stores individual epi-
sodes. When stored in conjunction with related episodic vignettes,
categorical scripts are formed. At the highest level are hypothetical
scripts that can be used as "script ensembles." Hypothetical scripts
permit the actor to draw from multiple vignettes when making a
decision.
Gioia and Manz summarized script processing as follows:
[T]he evolution from the primitive and specific episodic script to the
complex and wide-ranging generalized script represents a progression
from the concrete to the abstract, and from the context-bound to the
general. Once evolved, the generalized script serves as a functional
repertoire whereby a specific script that is appropriate for a given sit-
uation can be tacitly "deduced" and performed.7 7
Scripts, like other cognitive structures, are durable. Maria Kovacs
and Aaron Beck asserted that scripts represent prior experiences in an
organized way.78 They believed that cognitive schemas serve a tem-
plate function whereby stored information can be sorted, categorized,
evaluated, and labeled. Donald Meichenbaum and J. Barnard Gil-
more were concerned with structure. They explain that:
[a]n individual's cognitive structures serve as a kind of 'executive
processor' holding the 'blueprints' for thinking, feeling, and behaving.
The set of cognitive structures is the 'meaning system' that functions
to put behavior into motion, and then to guide the choice and direc-
tion of particular sequences of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors.7 9
75 Id. at 19.
76 Abelson, supra note 65, at 34.
77 Gioia and Manz, supra note 70, at 530.
78 Kovacs & Beck, Maladaptive Cognitive Structures and Depression, 135 Am. J.
Psychiatry 525, 525-33 (1978).
79 Meichenbaum & Gilmore, The Nature of Unconscious Processes: A Cognitive-
Behavioral Perspective, in The Unconscious Reconsidered 273, 289-90 (K. Bowers & D.
Meichenbaum eds. 1984) [hereinafter The Unconscious Reconsidered].
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Blake Ashforth and Yitzhak Fried identified the preservation of
cognitive capacity as a major function of scripts.s° They found that
scripted behavior helps "reduce qualitative overload and role ambigu-
ity, allowing the individual to focus on the task at hand."81 By per-
mitting individuals to perform routine functions automatically, scripts
conserve cognitive capacity to focus more consciously on new and
unfamiliar stimuli.
Sara Kiesler and Lee Sproull went further:
Given the limited capacity of human beings to deal with all of the
information in their environment, encoding must be a selection task.
But selection is not a process of arbitrarily picking and choosing
among all available information. Rather people attend to and encode
salient material-events that are unpleasant, deviant, extreme,
intense, unusual, sudden, brightly lit, colorful, alone or sharply
drawn. In the world of organizations, salient information includes
unanticipated drains on cash flow, new taxes and regulations
(unpleasant information), predictions of best and worst outcomes
(extreme information), disruptions of routines and emergencies
(intense, unusual, sudden information), and publicity and iconoclastic
executives (colorful information).82
Thus, if mindfulness has its "bounds," scripts find their place as
simplified models of much, and perhaps most, human behavior. As
Ashforth and Fried have argued, "much everyday organizational
behavior occurs quite mindlessly." '83
80 Ashforth & Fried, The Mindlessness of Organizational Behaviors, 41 Hum. Rel. 305,
305-29 (1988). More than their predecessors, Ashforth and Fried focused on the role of script
formation and scripted behavior in organizational settings. They argued against the pervasive
assumption that in organizations "individuals are cognitively alert, diligently attending to the
task environment and constantly processing information about the environment so that
behavior might be made more effective." Id. at 305. After reviewing works on organizational
concerns such as meetings (see Gioia & Poole, Scripts and Organizational Behavior, 9 Acad.
Mgmt. Rev. 449 (1984)), decisionmaking (see Starbuck, Organizations as Action Generators,
48 Am. Soc. Rev. 91 (1983)), performance evaluation (see Feldman, supra note 54, at 263-92),
social behavior (see Langer, supra note 66, at 35-58), and task performance (see Ashforth &
Ravid, Poor Service from the Service Bureaucracy: The Role of Mindlessness, Proceedings of
the 46th Ann. Mtg. Acad. Mgmt., 166, 166-69 (1986)), they deduced the general theme that
"much cognitive and behavioral activity occurs automatically or 'mindlessly' with little or no
real problem solving or conscious awareness." Ashforth & Fried, supra, at 306.
81 Ashforth & Fried, supra note 80, at 309.
82 Kiesler & Sproull, Managerial Response to Changing Environments: Perspectives on
Problem Sensing from Social Cognition, 27 Admin. Sci. Q. 548, 556 (1982).
83 Ashforth & Fried, supra note 80, at 311.
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2. Invoking Scripts
First, and perhaps foremost, researchers contend that scripts are
invoked mindlessly. Even when people believe they have been con-
sciously engaged, they often have been behaving from learned, stored,
and nonconsciously invoked scripts. At the first point of contact, a
previously unexperienced event is approached consciously; the event,
the actions and other elements comprising it, and the outcomes
related to it are simultaneously stored. After repetitious contact with
similar events, the satisfying behaviors are overlearned, and subse-
quent confrontation with similar events is accompanied by minimal
awareness and otherwise mindless action. 4
Langer theorized that a "compliance script" might be called forth
in a research setting if subjects were confronted with a situation con-
taining elements sufficiently familiar to invoke a script from the sub-
jects' repertoires.8 5 Her hypothesis was that subjects might have a
script of the nature: "favor X + reason Y -> comply.,8 6 Subjects
were in three groups with all subjects about to use a Xerox machine in
a library. Subjects in each group received a slightly different request
from an approaching stranger:
1. Request Only: Excuse me, I have 5 (20) pages. May I use the
Xerox machine?
2. Placebic Information: Excuse me, I have 5 (20) pages. May I
use the Xerox machine because I have to make copies?
8 See Shiffrin & Schneider, Controlled and Automated Human Information Processing:
Perceptual Learning, Automatic Attending, and a General Theory, 84 Psychological Rev. 127
(1977). After a series of experiments, the authors concluded that a common stimulus can be
experienced differently and can result in the invocation of differentiated, automatic responses:
"For example, a red light might elicit a braking response when the perceiver is in a car, and
elicit a walking, halting or traffic-scanning response when the perceiver is a pedestrian." Id. at
156. Their research indicated that it takes considerable training (overleaming through
numerous repetitions) to develop an automatic response, but "once learned, an automatic
response will be difficult to suppress or alter." Id.
85 Langer, supra note 66, at 48.
86 Id.; see also Kitayama & Burstein, Automaticity in Conversations: A Reexamination of
the Mindlessness Hypothesis, 54 J. Personality & Soc. Psychology 219 (1988) (similar
research). These authors tested whether students would comply with a request for a sheet of
paper and found that "reasons" were less important to gaining compliance than Langer had
suggested. Rather, "it is more reasonable to assume that there exists a script that prescribes no
reason be stated following a request." Id. at 221.
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3. Real Information: Excuse me, I have 5 (20) pages. May I use
the Xerox machine because I'm in a rush?8 7
All subjects thereby received, in part, the same request, "May I use
the Xerox machine?," preceded by a favor/size statement. Five pages
represented a smaller favor and twenty pages a significantly larger
one. Groups Two and Three received reasons, with "because I have
to make copies" being a placebic reason in that it was implied in the
request itself. "Because I am in a rush" represented a real reason.
Both groups receiving "reasons," regardless of whether the reason
was real or placebic, rewarded the request for the smaller favor (five
pages) by complying almost all the time: 94% and 93%, respectively.
Group One, which received no reason, complied at a rate of 60%.
When the favor was larger (twenty pages), the group receiving a real
reason complied at a rate of 42%, whereas the other groups complied
24% of the time. The numbers suggest that providing any reason for
a small favor triggered the predicted compliance response, whereas
the large favor may have called attention to the placebic reason s8
In yet another experiment, Langer and her colleagues were inter-
ested in determining if a mindless processing could be elicited from
receipt of a written communication requesting the return of a mean-
ingless questionnaire.8 9 Their hypothesis was that the receipt of a
common kind of communication would result in a mindless response.
Believing that signed requests were more commonly received than
unsigned requests and that unsigned demands were more common
than signed demands, the group devised four conditions for their
experiment.
They constructed a polite, personal/request signed by a fictitious
person and an impersonal/demand that was unsigned. Both of these
conditions were believed to be congruent with the manner in which
mailed questionnaires most likely were received. A compliance script
was expected to be elicited in response to the more commonly
received type of message. On the other hand, receipt of a polite,
unsigned/request or a signed/demand would be incongruent with the
subjects' more common experiences. These messages were expected
87 Langer, supra 66, at 48.
8 Id.
89 See Langer, Blank & Chanowitz, The Mindlessness of Ostensibly Thoughtful Action: The
Role of "Placebic" Information in Interpersonal Interaction, 36 J. Personality & Soc.
Psychology 635 (1978).
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to be less subject to an automatic, mindless reaction and more likely
to generate a "mindful" response.
Eighty subjects were chosen randomly from a telephone directory,
forty from the white pages and forty from the classified section where
physicians were listed. The latter were chosen to represent a "high
status" group believed to face quite often the need to respond (or not
to respond) to mailed questionnaires. The questionnaires sent to all
subjects were comprised of inane items.
The only statistically significant finding was that the high status
group, the physicians, who received congruent messages, responded
by returning the questionnaire more often than their counterpart phy-
sicians who received incongruent messages. The physicians engaged
in mindless manner more often than the random status group. Pre-
sumably, the incongruency of the signed/demand or the unsigned/
request caused the physicians to think about the inane nature of the
questionnaire, and once such conscious thought had been given, a sig-
nificantly smaller number of them chose to return those kinds of sur-
vey instruments.
The researchers were careful to remind readers that their findings
did not suggest that physicians were more mindless than the random
status group. Rather, they suggested that physicians simply were
more likely to receive mailed questionnaires and hence were more sus-
ceptible to responding in a mindless, automated, scripted manner
because of their greater exposure to a redundant circumstance. Nev-
ertheless, it was concern over this result that led directly to another
experiment involving secretaries and the memos they commonly
receive.
In this experiment, the researchers, Langer and her colleagnes,
began by collecting eighty-three memos from the wastebaskets of
twenty secretaries to determine the nature of the written, verbal com-
munications to which the secretaries routinely responded. Of the
memos, 83% were of a type the researchers labeled impersonal/
request (e.g., "Please make twenty copies of this"). Such requests
were unsigned. The memo most routinely received by secretaries was
of this type; receipt was expected to invoke a nonconscious script and
a mindless response whereby the secretary would do what wls asked
regardless of the sensible or nonsensical nature of the request.
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The other types of test memos were labeled impersonal/demand,
personal/request, and personal/demand. The memos contained the
following messages:
Request: "I would appreciate it if you would return this paper
immediately to Room 238 through interoffice mail."
Demand: "This paper is to be returned immediately to Room 238
through interoffice mail."
Half of each of these messages were signed ("Sincerely, John
Lewis"), and half were unsigned and merely had a number (R374021-
A) at the bottom of the message.'
Note that the request was to return the paper on which the memo
was written to a nonexistent person in a nonexistent room. The
message simply made no sense. Note further that the unsigned/
request was congruent with the most normal routine (receive an
impersonal/request type of memo, then comply). Of those receiving a
congruent message, 90% responded as predicted. Those receiving
personal/request messages responded at a 70% rate, those receiving
impersonal/demand messages responded at a 50% rate, and those
receiving personal/demand messages responded at a 60% rate.
Langer and others considering these kinds of experiments suggested
that "perhaps there has been a misdirected emphasis on people as
rational information processors" and that "taken together [the experi-
ments] support the contention that when the structure of a communi-
cation.., is congruent with one's past experiences, it may occasion
behavior mindless of the details." 91 The subjects in Langer's experi-
ments had developed "compliance scripts" from their experience in
processing office memoranda. When these scripts were roused by
contrived, cuing stimuli, mindless compliance followed.92
Familiarity follows repetitious contact with similar environments.93
Ashforth and Fried suggested that the more experience we have with
a class of situations, the more easily categorized become the cues.94
We likely "categorize cues according to the match between stimulus
90 Id. at 641.
91 Id.
92 Id.; see also Ashforth & Fried, supra note 80, at 312 (related interpretations regarding the
cuing process).
93 Lord & Kernan, Scripts as Determinants of Purposeful Behavior in Organizations, 12
Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 265 (1987).
94 Ashforth & Fried, supra note 80, at 312.
1991] 1149
Copyright 1991 Virginia Law Review, used by permission
Virginia Law Review
features and cue prototypes abstracted from repeated exposure."95
Ashforth and Fried posited that we interpret ambiguous stimuli in a
way "consistent with the anticipated script or recall[] script-consis-
tent events that did not in fact occur. ' '96
Even seemingly conscious decisions seem to have important scrip-
tive components. Paul Slovic and Sarah Lichtenstein suggested that
when facing a judgment, the situation of the judgment is a prime
determinant of how the task is approached.97 They considered
"structure" as an important element in script processing. They noted
that:
The order in which information is received affects its use and integra-
tion but the specific form of sequential effects that occur is dependent
upon particular circumstances of the decision task. Similarly, the
manner in which information is displayed and the nature of the
required response greatly influence the use of that information. In
other words, the structure of the judgment situation is an important
determinant of information use.98
A stored script may be retrieved even when apparently relevant
attributes are missing. Each schema contains various correlated
attributes associated with a "particular stimulus domain." 99 When a
configuration "is matched to a schema and the configuration is miss-
ing certain attributes usually found in that domain, search behavior
may proceed... so as to obtain a fuller match.' ' oc
In addition, Thorngate believed that adults have stored thousands
of "caricatures" created from real or imagined experience and from
watching the experiences of others. 01 Those caricatures may be
"extracted from the current interaction and tested against past ones
through perceptual processing mechanisms much like words are per-
95 Id.
96 Id. at 318.
97 Slovic & Lichtenstein, Comparison of Bayesian and Regression Approaches to the Study
of Information Processing in Judgment, 6 Organizational Behav. & Hum. Performance 649
(1971).
98 Id. at 724.
99 Taylor & Crocker, Schematic Bases of Social Information Processing, in 1 Social
Cognition: The Ontario Symposium 89, 103 (E. Higgins, C. Herman & M. Zanna eds. 1981).
100 Id.
101 Thorngate, supra note 71, at 33. Thorngate believed that normal adults store in memory
thousands of "caricatures" devolving from both direct and observed experiences. If a situation
similar to a caricatured experience arises, then responses to the caricature "will be sampled to
determine if any satisfactory response can be recalled" for implementation. Id.
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ceived and processed through recognition memory. Little if any con-
scious thought will be invoked at this point. °10 2
In summary, the scripts and schemas that guide a high proportion
of human behavior are developed from experiences (personal and
vicarious) and filed in our memory in categorized and labeled forms.
Different situations have distinguishing features that trigger appropri-
ate scripts. The process occurs in a mindless, nonconscious manner,
and once invoked, the script provides a map for subsequent behavior.
III. MINDLESSNESS AND LEGAL RULES
Part I of this Article concluded with the following question: how
can the information-starved, cognitively deluded decisionmaker act as
a wealth-maximizer and still respond to legal rules in the way pre-
dicted by law and economics? Script theory suggests an answer,
showing why economic analysis of law may work despite its seem-
ingly erroneous assumptions about human nature. As an instrumen-
tal matter, this explanation makes law and economics more credible
and provides a link to a large body of compatible empirical data. Sub-
stantively, script theory may help account for particular failures of
economic theory to correctly predict a legal outcome.
Section A of Part III defends law and economics by using script
theory to describe how people respond to legal rules. This endeavor
depends on establishing two propositions in the legal context. Propo-
sition (1): Individuals can be affected by environmental factors
(including legal rules) without being consciously aware of the effect.
Proposition (2): Even if only some individuals are affected by non-
conscious factors, others will often follow. We conclude that script
theory provides sufficient support for these propositions. A third
proposition is suggested. Proposition (3): The effect of nonconscious
factors, through either mechanisms (1) or (2), tends to make individu-
als' behavior efficient. Proposition (3) requires direct empirical sup-
port; this Article can do no more than render it more plausible.
Since these propositions are intertwined, they are not presented
seriatim, but rather take shape throughout a detailed discussion of
mindlessness and driving. Section B of Part III notes the importance
of behavioral norms in Section A (especially regarding Proposition
(2)). Also, by examining the work of Robert Ellickson, Section B
102 Id.
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explores whether conformity to cultural norms diminishes the
descriptive power of law and economics as applied to the common
law.
A. Mindlessness and Driving
An economist would confidently predict that a law regulating the
operation of automobiles that provided decreased incentives to take
care would result in a higher rate of accidents. Such predictions have
been empirically verified. 10 3 Given that most people probably do not
consciously consider the content of tort law when making most of
their driving decisions, by what mechanism does a change in the law
result in more accidents?'04
L Driving Scripts
A great deal of the driving that we do is done mindlessly. 05 The
discussion in Part II of this Article would suggest that we frequently
drive automatically by employing some sort of a driving script (or
combination of driving scripts).?° Although we receive lessons in
high school and are occasionally warned to be careful, our habits are
shaped on the road as we drive surrounded by fellow members of our
community. For example, the speed at which we drive, how closely
we follow others, and when we use our turn signal probably are
scripted behaviors. It seems very likely that our driving scripts, once
learned, are followed mindlessly. We have not identified any specific
study that measures the precise degree to which we behave mind-
103 See, e.g., Landes, Insurance, Liability, and Accidents: A Theoretical and Empirical
Investigation of the Effect of No-Fault Accidents, 25 J.L. & Econ. 49 (1982) (finding that no-
fault auto accident laws may have increased traffic deaths up to 15% in some states).
104 This is especially relevant in the context of no-fault driving laws that resulted in
increased insurance premiums and, presumably, priced some risky drivers off the road. See
R.W. Grayston, Deterrence in Automobile Liability Insurance (1971) (Ph.D. thesis, Univ. of
Chi., Grad. Sch. Bus.).
105 We choose driving as our archetypical example for three reasons: first, it is a familiar
activity; second, the assertion that driving involves some scripted behaviors should be
relatively uncontroversial; finally, economists have focused on driving behavior in their
research. See supra notes 103-04.
106 Abelson describes script combinations as categorical or hypothetical depending roughly
on their degree of complexity. Simple single-behavior scripts are labeled "episodic." See
Abelson, supra note 65, at 35.
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lessly, but researchers suggest it is probably quite high.10 7 How else
can we argue with our spouse or concentrate on solving an office
problem while simultaneously traveling down the road?108
In fact, it would appear that we have innumerable types of driving
scripts. The operation of a stick shift-the interrelated motions of
hands and legs in changing gears at the appropriate time-might be
described as an episodic script. A meta-script (according to Abelson,
a "hypothetical" script) of much greater magnitude mindlessly pilots
me much of the way to work each morning. We seldom think about
when to turn or which lane to enter to make the turn easier; the acts
are performed quite automatically. The driving-to-work script of
some professors is so strong that many Saturday morning shopping
trips have mindlessly ended in the University parking lot (an experi-
ence shared by several of our colleagues).
2. Mindless Information Gathering and Response
The phenomenon of scripting is crucial to understanding how legal
rules can affect decisionmaking when information is ostensibly imper-
fect and rational processes are apparently not focused on a relevant
decision. Research into scripting and script development indicates
that appearances can be deceiving. Mindless behavior may be much
better informed and more "rational" than previously supposed.
Kenneth Bowers, for example, has found that "human behavior
and thought is sensitive and responsive to information that is not
noticed or comprehended."' 109 People need not be able to recite or
explain a legal rule in order to "know" it and respond to it."' After
considering the work of Donald Mackay,"' and J.R. Lackner and
107 See Ashforth & Fried, supra note 80, at 306 ("much cognitive and behavioral activity
occurs automatically or 'mindlessly' "); id. at 313 (suggesting that "a limited number of rules
are sufficient for most behavior and that these are apt to be invoked regularly"); Langer, supra
note 66, at 38 ("Most behavior may be enacted without paying attention to it, even complex
social interaction.").
108 Some of the earliest investigation into mindlessness involved simultaneous behaviors.
See Solomons & Stein, supra note 66, at 492 (documenting simultaneous reading and writing).
109 Bowers, On Being Unconsciously Influenced and Informed, in The Unconscious
Reconsidered, supra note 79, at 227, 256.
110 Id. at 237.
III Mackay, Aspects of the Theory of Comprehension, Memory and Attention, 25 Q.J.
Experimental Psychology 22 (1973).
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M.F. Garrett, 112 Bowers concluded that we notice and use more infor-
mation than we can recall.1 13  In scriptive mode, we process and
respond to information that we cannot articulate. This research indi-
cates that subjects' answers to questions about their active knowledge
of the law give little indication of the extent to which the law affects
their behavior. People may very well respond to legal rules that they
cannot articulate or remember.
The related phenomenon of "vicarious learning" has been well-doc-
umented. 114 People do not act in a vacuum. We are constantly, ines-
capably bombarded with stimuli from our environment, and when we
operate in a scripted mode, we remain in tune to much new informa-
tion. Research in the area of organizational behavior suggests that
"automatic, schema-based information processing also plays a signifi-
cant role in the content of many organizational behaviors." '15 We
learn vicariously from the sum of our environmental stimuli, and
scripts constitute "the core of vicarious learning. ' 16
Psychologists have on numerous occasions demonstrated that indi-
vidual behavior within a group mindlessly conforms to a group
112 Lackner & Garrett, Resolving Ambiguity: Effects of Biasing Context in the Unattended
Ear, 1 Cognition 359 (1972).
113 See Bowers, supra note 109, at 237-38. Bowers summarized the work of Mackay as
follows:
In this experiment, subjects wore headphones and were asked to repeat word for word
(shadow) short sentences presented to one ear, while ignoring any material presented to
the other ear. The shadowed sentences were ambiguous, and could be interpreted in
one of two ways. For example, the sentence "They threw stones toward the bank
yesterday" can be interpreted quite differently depending on how the word "bank" is
understood-either as a river bank, or as a place where money is kept. Every time an
ambiguous word appeared on the attended channel, another word, which resolved or
"disambiguated" the meaning of the shadowed sentence (e.g., the word "river" or
"money") was simultaneously presented on the unattended channel. After shadowing
28 such sentences, subjects were presented with the two disambiguated renditions for
each of the original ambiguous sentences, and asked to select the alternative which was
recognizably closer to their initial understanding of the sentence.
For ambiguities of the type illustrated above, interpretation of the sentences was
significantly shifted in the direction of the disambiguating word presented on the
unattended channel. This shift occurred despite the fact that subjects were unable to
recall the words presented on the unattended channel.
Id. (footnote omitted).
114 See Gioia & Manz, supra note 70.
115 Id. at 529.
116 Id. at 531.
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norm. 117 The group norm is not the product of conscious consensus.
Rather, a group tends to act as a single organism, impounding all
available information and adjusting as a whole; individuals within the
group conform automatically. Studies of group norms are helpful in
understanding how an individual's driving script will tend to conform
to what could be called the "majority script."11 A majority script,
when one exists, is simply the way in which most actors mindlessly
perform the same type of task. If most drivers on a road are driving
at a certain speed, we may mindlessly do the same. Similarly, we may
conform our following distance to the norm of the community in
which we drive.
To summarize at this point, we note there are at least three related
ways by which people with ostensibly imperfect information actually
function as though they mindfully acquired and possessed perfect
information. First, we may "notice" and utilize information that we
cannot articulate or recall. We may not have paid attention to infor-
mation contained in our insurance bill, but nonetheless we may have
unconsciously noticed it and responded to it. Second, we may learn
vicariously from our environment, in particular by coming into con-
tact with the behavior of others. Finally, if we unconsciously conform
our behavior to an environmental norm, we are mindlessly utilizing
information to which we have no cognitive access.11 9
Applying this body of research to driving is revealing. Adjustments
to driving conditions may be made mindlessly; in fact, we may not
even be aware of a condition or new information unless its novelty
jerks us into mindfulness. Our unconscious receptors are attuned to
117 See, e.g., Gerard, Wilhelmy & Conolley, Conformity and Group Size, 8 J. Personality &
Soc. Psychology 79 (1968).
118 See Abelson, supra note 65, at 33 (stating that "many scripts are culturally so
overlearned that they are virtually universal").
119 Some researchers suggest an evolutionary basis for this phenomenon. See Campbell,
Rationality and Utility from the Standpoint of Evolutionary Biology, in Rational Choice,
supra note 3, at 171. Campbell emphasizes the organic nature of human behavior. We
function as a group, mindlessly utilizing the experience of the species as a whole. Although we
often behave mindlessly, our interaction with the human organism provides us with
information to which we often automatically respond. The overall human enterprise might be
fairly efficient, even if its individual parts are not. See also Zelthauser, Comments: Behavioral
Versus Rational Economics: What You See Is What You Conquer, in Rational Choice, supra
note 3, at 251, 264 ("We all know that nature optimizes, at least over the long run ...
bumblebee economics is well established. The question is whether human beings can do as
well in the much richer and more rapidly changing environment they confront.").
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others on the road who may be reacting directly to some condition.
For example, we may sometimes utilize a "follow the leader" driving
script. We may not consciously adjust for a curve that appears ahead,
but we turn the wheel of the car because we are automatically follow-
ing the driver in front of us who presumably conforms his driving to
the curve. The same script may enable us to avoid hitting a pedes-
trian whom we do not realize is standing too close to the road. As the
cars in front of us veer to the left, so do we. We may never register
that the pedestrian would be endangered had we remained on course.
We do not make an explicit calculation of costs and benefits, nor do
we consciously access all information relevant to the decision to veer,
yet we behave as if we do.
A substantive legal rule governing driving is a driving condition. It
is information, and research on scripting and conformity strongly sug-
gests that everyone need not know about the rule to react to it. If the
driving experience is communal, or if our scripts are adjustable to
other conditions and behaviors, a trickle-down effect can be expected.
Trickling may take a while, but our scripts eventually should adjust
(most of the time) to relevant information so long as at least some
drivers are cognizant of it.120
Driving most often is mindlessly interactive and very often part of a
communal act. The knowledge of one-for example, the driver in the
front of the line who sees the pedestrian standing too close to the
road-is transmitted to the whole (who begin veering away even
before they realize a pedestrian is ahead). Actors often behave as if
they knew a condition, when, in fact, they do not have access to the
knowledge. Given that much of our behavior is scripted, we may
respond to external stimuli in a far more efficient manner than previ-
ously assumed. What has been referred to as the problem of imper-
fect information may not be so threatening to the application of
economics to law. At least as regards scripted behavior, the assump-
tion of an informed decisionmaker may be quite realistic. At the very
least, studies conducted by asking respondents what they "know"
about the law should be discounted.
Of course, critics of law and economics pursue their case beyond
mere information failure. They also question our human ability to
120 Such direct knowledge might come from news reports of a change in the law or from
information provided by insurance companies when billing.
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process information in the manner predicted by economic theory. A
brief foray into the specific problem of negligence illustrates how
script theory may be used to blunt that critique and serve as an intro-
duction to the thornier problem of so-called nonlegal norms.
3. Negligence and No-Fault Laws
It has been demonstrated that the adoption of no-fault accident
laws in theory provides fewer incentives for drivers to take due care
than does the traditional negligence regime.121 This recognition has
not prevented the erosion of the adoption of no-fault accident laws. 122
The point made by the economists has been considered a technical
one; diminished incentives exist in theory, but in reality people will
not drive more recklessly in response to a change in tort law. People
often are unaware of damage rules, and even those who happen to
know them can hardly be expected to alter their risk assessments at
the margin and drive differently. The economic prediction of less
careful driving, which seems to be borne out empirically, 23 would be
more credible if we could explain how the change in the law altered
driving behavior. Script theory may offer an explanation.
If driving is primarily scripted behavior, and drivers tend to adhere
to the norm (the majority script), then a shift to no-fault accident law
should alter driving behavior if a sufficient number of motorists have
knowledge of the legal change in driving conditions. The driving
community should impound the information relating to the change.
Some unknown number of drivers will constitute the critical mass
necessary to alter the norm, and that number may be quite small. In
the example of the lead driver swerving to avoid the pedestrian stand-
ing too close to the road, only one driver of a long line of drivers had
actual knowledge of the changed condition, yet all complied. The
group-that particular driving micro-organism-required only mini-
mum actual notice.
That swerving example merely illustrates that when relatively few
motorists change their behavior, they affect the behavior of others.
Once a driving norm has incorporated a particular legal rule, drivers
behave as if they know the rule merely by conforming to the norm.
121 See W. Landes & R. Posner, supra note 7, at 54-84.
122 See id. at 136-37 & nn.30-33.
123 See supra notes 103-04.
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Yet this observation does not explain why any particular driver (and
those acting similarly to create a critical mass) first exercises more or
less care on the road. The hard question, one that critics of law and
economics would be quick to pose, is why would even one driver per-
form less carefully given knowledge of a change in liability rules? I
did not decide to drive with less care when I moved to Georgia (a no-
fault state until 1991).124 If I, an educated and informed lawyer who
delights in rational decisionmaking, did not consciously adjust to the
change in the applicable legal rule, who ever would?
Script theory responds that information that should affect our
behavior will affect our behavior-unless it is consciously disre-
garded. 125 If I consciously and mindfully disregard the fact that I can
breathe a sigh of financial relief as I enter Georgia (since my own
negligence will no longer bar my recovery), then I can maintain my
previous level of care. My experience indicates, however, that I can
only perform consciously and mindfully behind the wheel for brief
periods of time. For example, although I decelerate to 55 mph when I
can think to do so, I stray beyond that as soon as I drift back to my
normal mindless/scripted mode. Once the relevant information has
been processed by my brain, only conscious effort can prevent it from
being used.126
In other words, even if it is unlikely that a substantial number of
drivers who know of a change in liability rules will consciously change
their behavior, mindless decisions might not remain unaffected. If
much driving is done mindlessly, then relevant changes in liability rules
should affect behavior.
The first day a no-fault regime replaces a negligence system, no
change in levels of care might be perceptible. But once the rules begin
to affect postaccident experiences (primarily through the eye-opening
124 Of course, I may now drive with less care if I unconsciously conform to a Georgia
driving norm that requires less care, but that does not answer the question as to how that norm
established itself in the first place.
125 See Bowers, supra note 109, at 237-38 (referring to Mackay's study where subjects'
behavior was affected by information that the subjects could not recall); see also id. at 233
(citing a study that described unknowing responses to stimuli); Lucas, Adaptive Behavior and
Economic Theory, in Rational Choice, supra note 3, at 217 (emphasizing the gradual process
by which communities adapt to new information).
126 Presumably, this conscious effort could include the purposeful restructuring of an entire
script. A golf swing, although a scripted act for the experienced player, could be relearned and
result in a different scripted behavior.
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experience of not bearing the full cost of driving misconduct), levels of
care should be affected as well. Although surveyed drivers might
claim that their driving is not influenced by the changed rule, script
theory suggests that such questioning would be inapposite. Bowers,
for example, reports "[a] particularly graphic illustration of how a
stimulus event [i.e., a postaccident experience] can be noticed without
any appreciation of its influence." 27 Other researchers have con-
cluded that decisionmakers "have no direct introspective access to the
determinants of their behavior," '28 indicating that our driving behav-
ior is affected by information that we might think irrelevant or claim
not even to possess. Furthermore, this inability to access the determi-
nants of our behavior would seem especially likely to occur in the
context of mindless/scripted decisionmaking.
Script theory suggests that the common critique of law and eco-
nomics, that "people just don't make decisions that way," is naive.
We have a far greater unconscious ability to gather and process infor-
mation than the critics suppose. At least as applied to scripted behav-
ior, tort rules very well may play the role economists assume they
play.
127 Bowers, supra note 109, at 245. Bowers conducted a study that first determined whether
the subjects preferred landscape or portrait paintings. See Bowers, The Psychology of Subtle
Control: An Attributional Analysis of Behavioural Persistence, 7 Can. J. Behav. Sci. 78 (1975).
During the operative portion of the experiment, he selectively reinforced the subjects' choice of
their initially nonpreferred type of painting. The following dialogue is representative of the
results of the experiment:
EXPERIMENTER: Did you pick landscapes or portraits more often?
SUBJECT: Landscapes.
EXPERIMENTER: Did you notice whether I said anything during the experiment?
SUBJECT: You said "good" whenever I picked landscapes.
EXPERIMENTER: Do you think your tendency to pick landscapes was influenced
by my reinforcement of them?
SUBJECT: Of course not! I picked the landscapes because I liked them better than
the portraits. Besides, you only said "good" after I made my choice, so
what you said couldn't have influenced my selection of pictures.
Bowers, supra note 109, at 245. Bowers concluded that merely noticing a crucial determinant
of behavior does not equate with appreciating it as determining the behavior. Logically, infor-
mation gleaned mindlessly, and perhaps not even noticed, would similarly determine behavior
in an unappreciated manner. Id.
128 See Bowers, supra note 109, at 246.
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4. Caveats and Defenses
We should take the time to soften our claims and to anticipate at
least one important criticism. We do not presume that people are
supernatural and faultless gatherers of information. This phenome-
non of nonconscious response to information should be more fre-
quently observed when transactions costs and measurement costs are
low. For example, a practiced golf swing is generally scripted behav-
ior. If a golfer hears, however, that rotating the clubface through the
ball will result in increased distance on his drives, it is unlikely that he
will unconsciously improve his swing on the basis of this new infor-
mation. Similarly, a valuable typing tip from my secretary will proba-
bly fail to become imbedded in my typing script. Clearly, valuable
information does not automatically enhance the performance of
scripted tasks. Transaction costs might be too high. A golf swing is a
complex and unnatural behavior. Most golfers readily will admit that
the best swings are those mindlessly performed; mindless repetition is
the only path to success. A behavior that is purposely scripted at a
great cost may be highly resistent to change. In fact, some scripted
behaviors (undoubtedly my typing is one of them) may be so resistent
to change that conscious relearning may be the only method. In addi-
tion, new information is not always clearly valuable. How do we
know that this golf tip or typing tip will work? Just how valuable is
the tip? The value of new information may be discounted by
uncertainty.:
In addition, and probably most importantly, behaviors like a golf
swing and typing are not particularly communal activities. In other
words, unlike driving, norms play a less important role. Vicarious
learning and unconscious movement toward a norm that incorporates
new and relevant information would seem less likely to occur.
This section has already responded to one of the critiques presented
in Part I. We hope that we have provided an answer to the simple
criticism that "people just do not make rational, well-informed deci-
sions in the face of legal rules." This statement begs for an explana-
tion as to how uninformed and irrational human beings possibly could
react to liability rules in the way predicted by economics. Script the-
ory suggests a mechanism by which such decisionmaking may occur
in certain circumstances. Arguments based on cognitive illusions,
however, deserve separate treatment.
1160 [Vol. 77:1127
Copyright 1991 Virginia Law Review, used by permission
Mindlessness and Law
Numerous studies, some of which are summarized in Section 3 of
Part I.B, have been used to criticize the assumption that deci-
sionmakers behave rationally and efficiently in the manner predicted
by law and economics. These studies purport to demonstrate the
existence of cognitive illusions. Basically, the subjects in these studies
did not assess accurately relevant information, and consequently they
made inefficient decisions. We do not question the validity of these
results, but we do question the way they have been used in the debate
over law and economics.1 29 These studies demonstrate not so much
the existence of cognitive illusions, but that a script developed in one
environment does not function effectively in a significantly different
environment.
The subjects in the studies were presented with unfamiliar situa-
tions or problems, and, not surprisingly, their scripts sometimes failed
them. Script theorists frequently cite various studies, especially one
by Daniel Kalmeman and Amos Tversky, as support for the existence
of scripted behavior (although they are cited by critics of economics
as having proven that man is not perfectly rational). One way to illus-
trate scripting is to present people with a situation where a script will
fail them; evidence of significant failure is presumed to prove that the
behavior has been directed by sources (e.g., a script) beyond the con-
sciousness of the subject at hand.130 Such studies do several things:
First, they enforce the conclusion that scripting is a common phe-
nomenon. Second, they indicate that scripts probably work most effi-
ciently in the environment in which they are developed. Third, they
demonstrate that decisionmakers cannot adapt instantaneously.
The existence of cognitive illusions, however, does not necessarily
show that on a grand scale human beings are inefficient deci-
sionmakers. In addressing the claims central to Tversky and
Kahneman's work, "one probably has to emphasize the shift-in-ecol-
ogy argument: human brains formed in one ecology of problems are
now being used in quite another."'131 The conclusion to be drawn
129 For a critique of the use of cognitive illusions to justify government intervention in
markets, see Scott, Error and Rationality in Individual Decisionmaking: An Essay on the
Relationship Between Cognitive Illusions and the Management of Choices, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev.
329 (1986).
130 See Langer, supra note 66, at 42-50 (summarizing several studies where scripts were
invoked at inappropriate times).
131 Campbell, supra note 119, at 175.
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from studies involving "shifted ecologies" should not be applied to
human behavior in general. When people have adapted to a condition
over time, a script that constitutes an efficient response to that condi-
tion will not necessarily work in a radically different arena.
The research of Robert Lucas indicates that economic theory is
probably most applicable to scripted behavior.132 Lucas canvassed a
number of studies and concluded that as human behavior adapts, it
becomes more efficient. 133 The more familiar the task, the more effi-
ciently it will be performed. Mindless/scripted behavior, of course,
would seem to be the ultimate in adapted behavior. In commenting
on Lucas' work, Sidney Winter reaches back with approval to an apt
quote from Joseph Schrumpeter:
The assumption that conduct is prompt and rational is in all cases a
fiction. But it proves to be sufficiently near to reality, if things have
had time to hammer logic [a script?] into men. Where this has hap-
pened, and within the limits in which it has happened, one may rest
content with this fiction and build theories upon it. 134
At least as applied to scripted behavior, law and economics may be
able to "rest content" with its assumptions. The critique of those
impressed with the study of cognitive illusions does not validly extend
to the bulk of behavior that is script-driven within the environment
where the script was adapted.1 31
A different sort of attack on studies demonstrating cognitive illu-
sions comes from Kenneth Bowers. 136 He notes that these studies
demonstrate that intuition frequently does not generate a correct final
solution to a problem. "[P]eople participating in investigations of
human judgment are typically required to generate final solutions
intuitively, whereas intuition might better be conceptualized as the
process of generating hunches or hypotheses that require further test-
ing before they are accepted as valid." 137 Bowers goes on to defend
intuition in the "context of discovery" as opposed to the "context of
132 See Lucas, supra note 125.
133 Id. at 228-29.
134 See S. Winter, Comments on Arrow and on Lucas, in Rational Choice, supra note 3, at
248 (quoting J. Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development 80 (1934)).
135 In fact, this may suggest when law and economics is most likely to fail: where no script
exists or when a shift in ecology has occurred.
136 See Bowers, Regehr, Balthazard & Parker, Intuition in the Context of Discovery, 22
Cognitive Psychology 72 (1990).
137 Id. at 73.
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justification." 138 In other words, decisionmaking is often multi-
staged. Intuition (a "discovery script") may generate a preliminary
hypothesis that, depending on the novelty of the situation,139 may
require conscious consideration before a judgment is made. Simply
because intuition is an inefficient means to consistently generate final
solutions (as Tversky and Kahneman have proven), this does not
mean that reliance on intuition in the discovery context is inefficient.
Nor does it mean that because man is intuitive, he is irrational.
We hope that the assumptions underlying economic theory as
applied to law no longer seem so exaggerated. Given the predomi-
nance of scripted behavior, economic theory should remain a valid
tool of analysis in a wide range of situations. By the same token,
script theory may help explain the failure of an application of eco-
nomic theory to a particular case. Finally, we note the important role
played by norms in script theory. In the next Section we relax the
assumption that legal rules provide relevant information that should
affect behavior. We then examine whether evidence of the importance
of nonlegal community norms threatens the law and economics
enterprise.
B. Custom and the Common Law
Script theory provides a mechanism that explains how information
can affect behavior. Economic analysis of law, however, posits more
than the adjustment of decisions to relevant information. It hypothe-
sizes that legal rules are a particularly important source of informa-
tion-so important, in fact, that a change in a legal rule often will
result in a change in behavior. Obviously, evidence that legal rules do
not affect decisioumaking seems threatening to the conclusion that
common law tort rules generally promote efficient behavior."4 This
Section explores the alleged "nonimportance" of legal rules in light of
script theory.
To illustrate, simply because I may conform to a less careful driv-
ing norm in Georgia than I did previously does not necessarily mean
that I am responding to a change in legal rules. Evidence of the sort
138 Id.; see also H. Reichenbach, Experience and Prediction 6-7 (1938) (defining "context of
discovery" and "context of justification").
139 Presumably, in a novel situation a script is less reliable, therefore necessitating conscious
reassessment.
140 See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
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gathered by Ellickson suggests that nonlegal community values may
have a greater impact on decisionmaking behavior than do legal rules.
He found, for example, that liability decisions made by residents of
Shasta County, California, conformed to local dispute resolution val-
ues and not to applicable California law. Script theory indicates that
scripted behaviors that are responsive to new information tend to
gravitate to a community norm; it would be consistent with Ellick-
son's position to assert that a community norm may not always be
driven by the applicable common law rule.14 ' Residents of Shasta
County seemed to be more motivated by the realization of a local
cooperative value than by the applicable common law rule. 42
L Fine Tuning the Rational Actor Model 143
It has been suggested that evidence like that collected in Shasta
County demonstrates the need to adjust the assumptions underlying
law and economics.44 Yet if script theory adequately explains how
mindless behavior may often mimic that predicted by the economists'
rational actor, then there is no need to fine tune the assumption. Evi-
dence collected by social scientists may strongly suggest that econo-
mists should weigh factors other than the relevant common law rule
in predicting decisionmaking; the more comprehensive the evidence of
an individual's or group's utility function, the more accurate the pre-
dictions will become. 4  But economists recognize this. After reading
Ellickson's study of decisionmaking in Shasta County, an economist
should be able to apply the familiar, rational actor model and cor-
rectly predict behavior. Of course, it will be a different prediction
141 In other words, script theory provides a response to critics like Latin, who will likely
continue to doubt economic theory until a credible mechanism explains how people respond to
legal rules of which they are seemingly unaware. Script theory is neutral in the Ellickson/
Posner debate, however, because it could explain unconscious responses to either legal rules or
nonlegal community values.
142 See Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle, supra note 2. Ellickson suggests these norms may be
more efficient than the applicable common law rule. If this were so, it would be a strong
critique of the assertion that common law rules maximize wealth.
143 See Ellickson, Culture and Human Frailty, supra note 2, at 26 (calling not for a
paradigm shift, but "rather only a paradigm improvement").
144 Id. at 55.
145 Presumably, all extant valuable information is normally plugged into the simple
economic model. Information on particular utility functions, however, is seldom available.
The wisdom of increasing the cost of using the simple economic model by actively developing
information on unknown utility functions is a difficult question that we do not seek to answer.
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than one about behavior in some other county, because the sociologist
has given the economist important information about different rela-
tive values.
Ellickson's work therefore is consistent with the rational actor
model. People in different locales have different tastes. In identical
situations, two people may make different decisions, and depending
on the tastes of the decisionmakers, opposite choices may be utility-
maximizing. Take, for instance, the decision to employ a man or a
woman (with slightly better credentials) for a job whose tasks are gen-
der-neutral. A decisionmaker who is indifferent to gender maximizes
utility by hiring the woman. A decisionmaker who derives utility
from discriminating against women satisfies this taste for discrimina-
tion and maximizes utility by hiring the man. 146 Given adequate
information about the decisionmaker, an economist will correctly pre-
dict different employment decisions.
The usefulness of the rational actor assumption is not threatened by
the suggestion that rational actors in different places might make dif-
ferent decisions because the norms of their respective communities
affect their utility functions. It may, however, threaten claims about
the efficiency of the common law.
2. Custom, Efficiency, and the Common Law
If the common law, as claimed by proponents of law and econom-
ics, is a system of rules that encourages the maximization of utility by
providing appropriate incentives and disincentives, then the claim
that legal rules frequently do not affect behavior must be taken seri-
ously. It is essentially a claim that the common law, as described by
legal economists, does not work. A legal rule may not affect behavior
for several reasons. First, it may be essentially unknown. Even the
application of script theory to tort law would suggest that at least a
critical mass of community members must have encountered the rule
for the group norm to be affected. Second, and most importantly
here, a relevant cultural value or taste may "override" the rule. If
such cultural values frequently "override" the common law, and com-
146 Recognizing this taste for discrimination has now become routine. See Posner, supra
note 1, at 1321 ("Misogyny, for example, is a morally unattractive trait, but from an economic
standpoint it may be no different in character from having an aversion to cabbage or rutabaga
.... "); see also G. Becker, The Economics of Discrimination 14 (2d ed. 1971) (measuring
prejudice as the amount of money a person will pay to satisfy a taste for discrimination).
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pliance with these values represents the utility-maximizing satisfac-
tion of tastes in an economic sense, then the law and economics
enterprise may need more than fine tuning.
The nature of the common law, however, suggests that the Shasta
County experience should be infrequent for four reasons:
a. Custom. Much of the common law springs not from the theo-
retical project of a group of early judges, but from the custom of the
people. Professor A.W.B. Simpson in his now familiar essay The
Common Law and Legal Theory147 argues persuasively that the origin
of most common law rules is to be found in the actual practice of the
people whose behavior they governed. The Law Merchant, developed
by early English businessmen and explicitly based on their own com-
mercial practice, is an easily identifiable example of this phenomenon.
If common law rules arise from custom, which presumably is nothing
more than the way in which a group of people satisfy a set of similar
tastes, then it would not be surprising to find that the common law
and community norms seldom diverge. When custom is the source of
the common law, the content of the law should usually incorporate
the sort of values identified in the Shasta County study.
b. Rules Accommodating Culture. The content of the common
law itself is sensitive to diversity. The backbone of tort law is the
"reasonable person." Reasonableness is an absolute defense to many
tort claims. Who is the reasonable person? How does this person
behave? A more slippery legal concept hardly could be imagined. The
reasonable person may be nothing more than the "typical" person,
the normal person we actually see in our community. What is reason-
able may be what is acceptable under a community's norms. The con-
cept of the reasonable person allows tort law to flex and adapt to
changes in a society. It effortlessly incorporates custom, and there-
fore a culture's values, into law. Thus, tort rules generally may take
into account the behavioral norms identified by Ellickson.
In addition, other common law rules expressly give individual
actors the opportunity to satisfy their tastes. The idea of freedom of
contract (and freedom to breach and pay damages instead) permits
people to satisfy a very wide variety of tastes. It is expressly designed
to allow people to place their own value on what they do, hence the
147 See Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence
77 (A.W.B. Simpson ed. 1973).
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rule that contract damages are based on the expressed subjective value
of performance to the nonbreaching party. 1 8 Common law contract
law permits members of a community to write their own enforceable
rules.
c Adaptability. The common law never has remained static. Law
professors differ on how and why the common law mutates, but its
flexibility is undeniable. If Professor Simpson is right about custom
being the driving force behind the common law, then changes in the
law most likely may be traceable to changes in cultural norms. The
dissolution of common law privity rules, the rise of unconscionability,
and the fall of the strict at-will doctrine may have been in response to
changing value systems. In fact, many decisions expressly justify
changes in the law on the basis of changes in society.14 9 The adapta-
bility of the common law should make gross incongruencies between
legal rules and cultural values, such as those found in Shasta County,
the exception rather than the rule.
d. Circularity. The assertion that cultural norms are heavily
influenced by legal rules should be relatively uncontroversial. Given
the existence of a powerful governmental apparatus designed to
implement the law, an army of professionals committed to upholding
the law, and a media fascinated with presenting the law to the public,
community values cannot remain unaffected. The more powerful the
force of law, the less likely we should observe divergences between
legal rules and cultural norms. The institution of the common law
itself must play a role in the creation and enforcement of norms.
The foregoing suggests that common law rules and cultural norms
seldom should diverge (or seldom should have diverged before our
current age of statutes). An interesting study of norms in the whaling
industry conducted by Ellickson suggests just that.150 He found that
a tight knit community of whalers developed their own rules (that
148 See, e.g., Groves v. John Wunder, 205 Minn. 163, 286 N.W. 235 (1939) (measure of
damages is expected value of completed performance); Radford v. De Froberville, 1 All E.R.
33 (1978); Restatement of Contracts § 346, comment c, illustration 4 (1932).
149 See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 466, 150 P.2d 436, 443 (1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring) ("The manufacturer's obligation to the consumer must keep pace
with the changing relationship between them."); Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 148, 119 N.W.
946, 947 (1909) ("It must be remembered that the common law is the result of growth, and
that its development has been determined by the social needs of the community which it
governs.").
150 See Ellickson, Whaling Industry, supra note 34.
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tended to be efficient) for settling whale ownership disputes. Interest-
ingly, common law judges uniformly deferred to local whaling custom
in deciding the few adjudicated disputes.15 1
Far from threatening economic analysis of law, the close relation-
ship between the common law and cultural norms indicates that the
common law is profoundly concerned with the maximization of utility
in the way it incorporates and facilitates the shared experience of the
community.' 52 Ellickson claims that the time has come for econo-
mists to recognize the importance of cultural norms (positing, we sup-
pose, "acculturated man" as well as "rational man"). Law and
economics swallowed that pill long ago in asserting that the common
law generally was efficient. This is not to say that the common law is
efficient. We merely assert that the common law by its history and
nature generally has accommodated the sort of norms identified by
those such as Ellickson. If this is true, then the occasional divergence
should not threaten the descriptive conclusion that common law rules
are designed to promote efficiency. If so, law and economics remains
a useful analytical tool.
3. Mindlessness and the Common Law
This discussion of the origin of the common law has implications
for the application of theories of mindlessness. If common law rules,
unlike statutory rules, are derived from custom and social norms, we
might not be surprised to see the economic model work when people
are conforming to cultural norms that approximate legal norms. In
other words, if our decisions conform to community behavioral
norms, and those norms are generally the fountainhead of the law,
then our decisions usually should be the rational responses predicted
by economists. In fact, if mindless behavior is more conforming than
mindful behavior, it may be the more rational in an economic sense.
We do not abandon our suggestion that people respond to statutory
law as well, but we find it worth noting that the common law may be
especially amenable to economic analysis for this reason.
151 Id. at 85.
152 Alas, our communities are much bigger than they used to be. The power of the common
law to facilitate the creation of wealth probably is inversely related to the size of the
jurisdiction.
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IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has, in part, been an attempt to respond to those who
contend that "[a] richer model for positive analysis... would look to
psychology to develop a more realistic view of cognitive processes,
and also look to sociology to obtain a more accurate picture of social
influences on human behavior." 153 In the context of negligence law,
we have applied recent insights from the field of psychology (script
theory) and recognized the overwhelming importance of social influ-
ences on human behavior. Strangely, no need to revise the economic
model has emerged. Script theory explains why people frequently
react to tort rules as economics might predict. It acknowledges the
behavioral influence of community values and in no way undercuts
the economic model. In short, psychology and sociology enrich our
understanding of the common law. Yet they do not threaten the
explanatory power of the economic model; rather they seem to com-
plement it. Given the workability and simplicity of the model, fine
tuning seems unnecessary.
Script theory helps defend law and economics from those who
attack its assumption of a rational decisionmaker on the basis that
people frequently lack adequate information and fail to adequately
process the information they do have. Script theory substantially
advances two key propositions underlying this defense: that individu-
als can be affected by environmental factors (including legal rules)
without being consciously aware of their effect; and that even if only
some individuals are affected by these nonconscious factors, others
will often follow. We cannot claim to have proven the further propo-
sition that the effect of these nonconscious factors through either
mechanisms (1) or (2) tends to make individuals' behavior efficient.
Nonetheless, script theory does render it more plausible.
We should once more note the modesty of our original purpose in
exploring the validity of the rational decisionmaker assumption in the
economic model. Economics might be applied fruitfully to law with-
out an exploration of this assumption. If hundreds of studies demon-
strate that the model works accurately, then who cares why the model
works? Good studies, however, are difficult and expensive to perform.
Room for argument about the success of the model remains. Hope-
fully, the exploration we have conducted will enhance the credibility
153 Ellickson, Culture and Human Frailty, supra note 2, at 23.
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of the model in the absence of overwhelming empirical evidence. In
fact, in that the studies we have discussed seem consistent with the
working of the model, that body of data should be seen as indirectly
supportive. Finally, resort to concepts such as script theory may be
used in the future to explain why economics cannot explain a particu-
lar phenomenon in the common law.lM Examining the validity of a
theoretical assumption should be confined to such modest goals:
enhancing credibility, providing linkage to other consistent bodies of
empirical data, and explaining divergences in observed phenomena.
15 For example, Mark Grady has suggested that economics does not adequately explain a
subset of cases where the tortfeasor has inadvertently forgotten to take a precaution. See
Grady, Why are People Negligent? Technology, Nondurable Precautions, and the Medical
Malpractice Explosion, 82 Nw. U.L. Rev. 293 (1988). Reasonable people sometimes forget.
Remembering to take a precaution may be costly. Economics would predict that courts would
take this cost into account when determining negligence. Grady claims they do not. He
claims that courts employ a per se negligence rule in cases of forgetfulness. Id. at 303. This
rule ignores the cost of remembering and cannot be explained by economics that (under the
Hand formula) would suggest that some forgetfulness is not necessarily negligent.
Script theory may explain the existence of this apparent divergence. If the cost of
remembering is usually very low, then the per se rule for forgetfulness would not be
inconsistent with the economic proposition that the common law should take such costs into
account in determining negligence. Grady assumes the cost is typically high and, therefore,
finds the rule troubling. If, however, a precaution is scripted (for example, mindlessly using a
turn signal), then the cost of remembering typically should be low. Once a script is in place, it
functions at a low cost, suggesting that a failure of the common law to account for such costs is
consistent with economics, as informed by script theory.
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